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Abstract. This paper proposes a method in which to formally specify the 
design and reliability criteria of an advisory system for use within mission- 
critical contexts. This is motivated by increasing demands from industry to 
employ automated decision-support tools capable of operating as highly reliable 
applications under strict conditions. The proposed method applies the user 
requirements and design concept of the advisory system to define an abstract 
architecture. A Markov reliability model and real-time scheduling model are 
used to effectively capture the operational constraints of the system and are 
incorporated to the abstract architectural design to define an architectural 
model. These constraints describe component relationships, data flow and 
dependencies and execution deadlines of each component. This model is then 
expressed and proven using SPARK. It was found that the approach useful in 
simplifying the design process for reliable advisory systems, as well as 
effectively providing a good basis of a formal specification. 
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1 Introduction 
 
Advisory systems are a type of knowledge-based system that provides advice to sup- 
port a human decision-maker in identifying possible solutions to complex problems 
[1]. Typically, any derived recommendation for a potential solution or description that 
accurately details a problem and its implications, requires a degree of embedded ex- 
pert knowledge of a specific domain. Advisory systems are often disregarded as 
examples of expert systems since there are several distinctive properties and 
characteristics between the two, despite sharing a similar architectural design [1]. The 
main difference is that an expert system may exist as an autonomous problem-solving 
 
 
 
 
 
 
system, which is applied to well-defined problems that requires specific expertise to 
solve [1]. An advisory system, in contrast, is limited to working in collaboration with 
a human decision-maker, who assumes final authority in making a decision [3]. Thus, 
the main objective of an advisory system is to synthesise domain specific knowledge 
and expertise, in a form that can be readily used to determine a set of realistic 
solutions to a broad range of problems within the domain area. The user is 
effectively guided by the system to identify potentially appropriate solutions that 
may maximise the possibility of producing a positive outcome and minimise the 
degree of risk. 
This objective is supported by the basic architecture of advisory systems [1], 
which compromises of four core components. These are: (1) the knowledge base that 
lists domain specific knowledge; (2) a data monitoring agent that collects (stream) 
data; (3) the inference engine that interprets problems from the data and uses expert 
knowledge to deduce suitable solutions and (4) the user interface for supporting 
human-computer interactions. In the literature, there are many examples of advisory 
systems that are deployed in various industrial settings using this architecture, such 
as finance, medicine and process control [3-10]. However, since system failures in 
these settings can result in potentially serious consequences, such as loss of revenue, 
loss of productivity and damage to property, it is important to ensure that advisory 
systems are both reliable and dependable [13]. In particular, it is imperative to ensure 
that advisory systems are properly verified and validated, as well as ensuring that the 
system is appropriately designed for reliability, where it may continue to perform 
correctly within its operational environment over its lifespan. Currently, there have 
been many proposals and applications of verification and validation (V&V) tools 
and techniques that focus on ensuring correctness in the design and implementation 
of knowledge-based systems [12-16]. It is frequently noted that current approaches 
in V&V for knowledge-based systems are limited as it is unclear if the system 
requirements have been adequately met [13]. This is primarily as a result of the 
presence of requirements that are difficult to formulate precisely, where reliability is 
considered to be one such requirement. 
This paper proposes a formal design method that aims to develop and evaluate a 
reliable design of an advisory system, which may be used as part of a formal 
specification. The method simply establishes a  general correctness criteria, based 
on the requirements specification and initial design concept, and develops an abstract 
architecture that incorporates operational constraints. The purpose of these constraints 
is to describe the correct operational behaviour of each component within the system, 
with respect to the correctness criteria, where violations of these suggest 
conditions for system failures. These constraints are captured through well-
established reliability modelling techniques, such as the Markov model, and the 
likeliness of successful operation under these constraints is examined. The abstract 
architecture and operational constraints are formally expressed using SPARK. The 
formal verification and validation tools within the Ada development environment, 
are useful in proving the operational constraints and thus can be useful in 
describing how reliability may be achieved in advisory systems. 
This paper is structured as follows: Section 2 provides a very brief background of 
advisory systems, in terms of general architecture, real-world applications and current 
 
 
 
 
 
 
development techniques. Section 3 provides an overview of the proposed design 
method. Sections 4, 5 and 6 discuss the application of this method to a current 
advisory system that has designed for use within the railway industry. Respectively, 
these section discuss: the user requirements and design concept; development of the 
architectural model and the implementation of this model using SPARK, which is 
applied to prove the constraints. Section 7 concludes the paper. 
 
 
2 Background 
 
The basic purpose of an advisory system is to assist the end-user in identifying 
suitable solutions to complex, unstructured problems [1-10]. In decision-making, an 
un- structured problem is one that is characterised with contextual uncertainty, 
where there are no definite processes in place for predictably responding to a problem 
– that is, well-defined actions that do not necessarily lead to predictable outcomes 
[2]. As such, problems of this nature require an analysis of all available information 
in order to properly describe the problem and to attribute suitable and realistic 
actions that minimises risk and maximises the possibility of yielding a positive 
outcome [1, 9]. This enables the decision-maker to form an assessment that would 
lead to a decision. The extent at which risk is minimised and the probability of a 
positive outcome is increased, determines the overall quality of a decision [4], 
where a good decision is one that significantly minimises risk and increases the 
possibility of desirable out- comes. 
The architecture of an advisory system, which is illustrated in Fig. 1 is structured 
according to three fundamental processes [1]: knowledge acquisition; cognition and 
interface. Knowledge acquisition is the process in which domain knowledge is 
extracted from experts and domain literature by a knowledge engineer, and is 
represented in a logical computer-readable format. The knowledge representation 
scheme used in advisory systems formalises and organises the knowledge so that it 
can be used to support the type of case-based reasoning implemented in the system. 
The cognition process encapsulates active data monitoring and problem 
recognition [4]. Data is processed and analysed to identify problems, based on types 
of statistical deviations. The cause of the problem can potentially be diagnosed by the 
system using intelligent machine learning algorithms or solutions to the problem can 
be identified based on case-based reasoning. The results of this are presented to the 
user through the interface, which essentially provides various features and facilities 
to ensure suitable human-computer interactions. This includes formatting the output 
in a human readable form, explanation facilities to enable transparency in the 
reasoning process of the system and facilities for user input, such as data or queries. 
As previously noted, current literature has many detailed applications for advisory 
systems in a variety of industrial sectors, including finance, transportation, energy, 
space exploration, agriculture, healthcare, business management and tourism. From 
these applications, it is clear that designs of advisory systems are based on the 
illustrated architecture and perform according to one of two main styles. These are: 
(1) monitoring and evaluation and (2) diagnosis and recovery [2-9]. In the 
monitoring 
 
 
 
 
 
 
and evaluation style, advisory systems simply monitor data streams to identify 
statistical anomalies that may represent a potential problem or to identify predictive 
behaviour patterns. In either case, data is modelled and analysed to provide some 
information, which is then interpreted through an evaluation procedure. This 
behaviour is described in the trading advisory system presented by Chu et al [4], in 
which the sys- tem monitors and evaluates stock market data to identify specific 
movements in the market that may provide lucrative trading opportunities. The 
system uses various economic rules and principles as expert knowledge to assist 
traders in making decisions on ideal types of stocks to buy and sell. 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 1. Advisory System Architecture, presented in [1] 
 
In the diagnosis and recovery style, parameters are manually input to the advisory 
system to frame a problem, where potential causes and/or solutions are automatically 
generated by the system from an analysis procedure. An example of advisory systems 
that adopt this style is described by Kassim and Abdullah [5]. Here, the advisory 
system is designed for use within agriculture is proposed for advising farmers on the 
most suitable rural areas and seasons in which to cultivate crops, as well as the types 
of crops that should be grown. Farmers provide the system with values for various 
input parameters to frame the problem, where expert knowledge is applied to infer 
possible solutions on which area a farmer is most likely to be successful and the types 
of crops that should be grown. In a final example, presented by Engrand and Mitchell 
[6], a set of advisory systems embedded in shuttle flight computer systems are de- 
scribed, where separate advisory systems are used for diagnosing malfunctions and 
handling faults. The user interacts with these systems to determine the cause of mal- 
functions and identify how these may be repaired. Data concerning the physical con- 
dition of the shuttle, is provided to these systems through the control system as a con- 
tinuous stream, where there is an immediate need for the advisory systems to respond 
in real-time. Various other examples of applications are also described in [2, 3, 7-10]. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
As advisory systems continue to be applied to various industrial settings, where 
failures can potentially have serious effects, reliability and dependability become 
important factors. This is to ensure that the software is likely to continue its intended 
function, without errors, and under specific conditions over a period of time [17]. 
There are many examples of software reliability models in the literature that can be 
applied to predict or estimate reliability in the software applications, where these 
approaches can provide meaningful results [18]. However, ensuring reliability in 
soft- ware is difficult to achieve as a result of high complexity, where advisory 
systems are considered to be very complex systems. This is because, unlike 
conventional soft- ware, there is a knowledge base that is used to provide various 
parameters for deducing conclusions, where the margin for error is greater. This has 
been the main reason why considerable emphasis has been placed on ensuring 
correctness in the representation and application of knowledge through advanced 
V&V methods and techniques [13-16]. Although various advancements have been 
made, V&V in knowledge based systems is a developing area of research, where 
many approaches are still in their infancy. Consequently, the focus of reliability has 
received little attention, although, there is a clear need to ensure that advisory systems 
are designed for reliability. 
 
 
3 Method Description 
 
The proposed method in this paper aims to provide a simple and thorough approach in 
which the design of an advisory system may be effectively described, in terms of user 
requirements, operational (or functional) requirements and overall system structure – 
which is the primary reason for focusing on advisory systems from an architectural 
perspective as each of these can be captured to an extent. As for the design of each 
specific component, this is only considered in terms of the architectural style for that 
component and the types of mechanisms that are expected to be present in order for 
the functional requirements to be successfully addressed. In effect, this provides 
specific guidelines for the implementation of the system and can potentially be 
useful when developing a formal specification. The process model of the method is 
presented in Fig. 2. 
     As can be seen from the diagram, the first process is the documentation of the 
user, non-functional and functional requirements, which are encapsulated in the 
system requirements. It is also expected that the requirements specification would 
also consist of a high-level design concept in which to begin considering an 
appropriate soft- ware solution. The next phase is the development of an abstract 
architecture that lists each of the core components for the system, with suitable 
descriptions of the function of these – particularly in terms of input and generated 
output, dependencies and basic function. This allows the designer to consider the 
structure of each component in which such functions may be achieved, which can 
easily be represented through a state machine. These state machines begin to 
become connected as dependencies are introduced into the model, which establishes 
an architectural model. This can be ex- tended by simply translating the 
architectural model into a Markov model, where probabilities of state transitions 
are defined. To ensure reliability, operational constraints are also used to extend 
 
 
 
 
 
 
the model which to define specific conditions that must be adhered to in order to 
ensure successful state transitions for the majority of cases. This can be in terms of 
ensuring the correct input format, defining conditions of failure and conditions for 
recovery. 
 
 
Fig. 2. Method Process Model 
 
It is appreciated that not every advisory system will be required to perform in real- 
time, therefore inclusion of a real-time scheduling model is optional. The purpose of 
this is to simply set deadlines for each component and conditions for execution time. 
With a description of the architectural model, it is then translated into a formal 
simulation prototype in which each of the constraints may be proven in concept, 
ensuring that there are no deadlocks, the system performs in accordance to the 
original requirements that were documented and performs correctly. Essentially, the 
formal prototype is to ensure correctness of the constraints in terms of their ability to 
satisfy the reliability criteria, which to ensure proof of termination, proof of 
correctness (which respect to requirements) and proof of real-time – which, at the 
design phase, can only be achieved in theory. 
 
 
4 System Requirements and Design Concept 
 
Given the description of the method, as described in the previous section, the remain- 
der of this paper considers the application to an active research project concerned with 
the design and development of next generation advisory systems. The requirements 
and design concept that is described in this section is for an advisory system that has 
 
 
 
 
 
 
been designed for use within the railway domain. The design and development of this 
system is the focus of an ongoing PhD project that is sponsored by Siemens Rail 
Automation and the Engineering and Physical Sciences Research Council (EPSRC). 
The purpose of this system is to identify ongoing or potential delays in an area of the 
rail- way network that is monitored by the traffic control system and to advise the 
traffic coordinator, as the decision-maker, on possible rescheduling strategies that 
may be applied to allow for (partial) recovery of a delay or to avoid potential future 
delays. The advisory system, in this context, is required to ensure that a reasonable 
degree of dependability in the railway network is maintained. This objective is 
motivated by active demands within the railway industry for systems that can 
provide automated support, particularly for dispatchers, who are mainly responsible 
for managing delays. Currently, dispatchers often rely on experience and intuition to 
make predictions of a train’s arrival time to a station based on the last known delays 
that were recorded and the train’s relative position. This method, as discussed in 
Martin [12], is considered imprecise since it does not account for partial recoveries 
or extended delays as it assumes that a train would maintain its current trajectory. 
A level of automation is therefore necessary to ensure improved accuracy in 
predictions of train arrival and departure times for each controllable point in its 
path. The potential of this proposed advisory system is the degree in which 
operational reliability may be improved by providing dispatchers with more 
accurate information, which can be incorporated in planning and re-planning 
processes. 
The user requirements for this system are particularly extensive, especially in terms 
of human-computer interactions. However, the key requirements are that the advisory 
system must extend the functionality of current operational control systems, such as 
the European Traffic Control System (ETCS), by providing advice that ensures 
robustness of the original timetable when disruptions to services occur. This 
directly states that all advice should be produced for the purpose of recommending a 
rerouting strategy for any disrupted services to ensure that each train is capable of 
arriving as close to the original timetabled deadline as possible. A delay of up to a 
maximum of 10 minutes is generally acceptable. The advice is also expected to be 
produced in real- time, which has been specifically defined as a time period between 
2-5 minutes. This is to allow time for decision to be made by the traffic coordinator, 
dispatcher or signal operator. Finally, the advice itself must be robust enough to 
ensure that any unintentional delays do not occur. This means that if a potential or 
ongoing delay has been recognized at a point in time in a specific section of the 
railway network, the advice should not list any suggestions that are likely to cause a 
delay later in the future. Other requirements also include enabling the user the easily 
understand and interpret the advice that is produced, where delays and problems 
can instantly be recognized and initiate the contingency planning process that takes 
place to accommodate for expected disruptions, as well provide some prompts on 
actions that may be taken to minimizes the effect of the disruption. 
  
 
 
 
 
 
5 System Architecture 
 
The abstract architecture, which implements the specification, for the rail advisory 
system, as illustrated in Fig. 3, is structured into four major components, which are 
the knowledge base, the inference engine, the data processing agent (or monitoring 
agent) and the interface. This architecture is based on the general advisory system 
architecture and the system concepts that were presented by Beemer and Gregg [1], 
where it has been modified specifically for addressing the key requirements outlined 
in the previous section. 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 3. Abstract architecture of the rail advisory system with data flow annotations 
 
As with general advisory systems, the role of the knowledge base is to simply store 
domain specific knowledge that is referenced by the inference engine, which frames 
the problem and identifies possible solutions that are both presented to the user via the 
interface. The inference engine is constructed from three main algorithmic sub- 
components, which are the prediction, rescheduling and advice generation algorithms. 
Respectively, these algorithms: receive information from the data processing agent to 
predict possible train delays that are likely to occur as well as to predict the potential 
impact of delays that are either ongoing or are likely; to use the predicted impact as a 
value for a cost metric to define cost of paths, where the cheapest and most feasible 
 
 
 
 
 
 
path is identified; and to use information of possible delays, the effects of these and 
the most suitable path(s) to generate understandable advice for the user. The advice 
generation algorithm is also expected to cross check the advice against previous ad- 
vice to ensure that the results are consistent. To ensure speed in processing, there is 
separate driver algorithm that extracts specific information from the knowledge base 
to provide the necessary heuristics that are required by both the prediction and the 
rescheduling algorithms. Finally, the data processing agent is responsible for 
extracting raw data from the control system and to process it to identify key 
statistical and stochastic information that can be used for prediction. 
 
 
5.1     Markov Reliability Model 
 
The Markov model consists of a list of the possible states of the advisory system, the 
possible transition paths between those states and the rate parameters of those 
transitions [17]. Fig. 4 presents a Markov state machine (sometimes called a Markov 
chain) with four distinct states. This general class of systems may be described at any 
time as being in one of a set of n distinct states, s1, s2, s3, ... , sn. The system 
undergoes changes of state, with the possibility of it remaining in the same state, at 
regular discrete time intervals. We describe the ordered set of times t that are 
associated with the discrete intervals as t1, t2, t3, ... , tn. The system changes state 
according to the distribution of probabilities associated with each state. We denote 
the actual state of the machine at time t as st. The states represent the following: S1 
is data processing; s2 is prediction; s3 is knowledge query and s4 is rescheduling. 
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Fig. 3. Markov model of cognition process 
 
A full probabilistic description of this system requires, in the general case, the spec- 
ification of the present state st, in terms of all its predecessor states. Thus, the proba- 
1 
1 1 1 
1 1 
1 
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bility of the system being in any particular state st is: p(st) = p(st | st - 1, st - 2, st - 3, 
...) where the st - 1 are the predecessor states of st. In a first-order Markov chain, the 
probability of the present state is a function only of its direct predecessor state: p(st) = 
p(st | st - 1 ) where st - 1 is the predecessor of st. We next assume that the right side of 
this equation is time invariant, that is, we hypothesise that across all time periods of 
the system, the transitions between specific states retain the same probabilistic rela- 
tionships. Based on these assumptions, we now can create a set of state transition 
probabilities aij between any two states si and sj as follows: aij = p(st = si | st - 1 = sj), 1 
≥ i, j ≥ N Note that i can equal j, in which case the system remains in the same state. 
The traditional constraints remain on these probability distributions; for each state si: 
N aij ≥ 0, and for all j, Σ aij = 1 i = 1. The system we have just described is called a 
first-order observable Markov model since the output of the system is the set of states 
at each discrete time interval. The transition probabilities are observed from the op- 
erational profile and are independent of component reliabilities. If component ci con- 
nects to n subsequent components { i k c | 1≤ k ≤ n }, the transition probability Pij 
between components ci and i j c is equal to ∑= n k t i j t i k 1 ( , ) ( , ). Here, t(i,j) is 
the total number of invocations or control transfers from component ci to i j c . In this 
section, we describe reliability modeling of software with single architectural style. 
For simplicity, the connector reliabilities will not be considered until the modeling of 
heterogeneous architecture in the next section. Four architectural styles are used to 
demonstrate how to model reliability of software with single architectural style. These 
styles include batch-sequential, parallel/pipe-filter, call-and-return, and fault tolerance 
styles. 
 
 
5.2     Real-Time Scheduling Model 
 
The performance criteria of the advisory system is classified as firm, where each 
component must perform according to a firm deadline. The term firm is used as the 
system must produce an output that is important for ensuring the dependability of the 
railway, however, complete failure to produce on time is expected to result in 
inconvenience and loss of productivity, rather a failure in the railway. There are 
many mathematical models available to represent scheduling that are used to 
implement scheduling algorithms. For the purpose of this paper, we refer to a 
simple static scheduling model, where each component in the advisory system, 
except for the knowledge base, performs a process that is described as being a 
sequence of tasks. The schedule is an assignment of the tasks to be processed so that 
each task is able to execute until completion. In the case study, it has been explicitly 
stated from potential end-users that a best execution time is any time that less than, 
or equal to 2 minutes. The worst case execution time was stated as being at most 5 
minutes. Any advice that was produced after 5 minutes would not be considered 
useful as it would require the dispatcher at least 10 minutes to make a decision, 
where 15 minutes would have elapsed before any decision was made and 
implemented, by which time the situation may be different given the constantly 
changing state of the railway network. In particular, time periods of up to 20 minutes 
in European national railway lines is considered significant as this the minimum time 
required to observe any real change in state 
 
 
 
 
 
 
[11]. The average execution time, therefore, would be any time between 2 and 5 
minutes. The schedule for each component. Development of the scheduling model is 
described in detail in [19], where we simply use the preemptive fixed priority sched- 
uling model to assess the feasibility of developing a fixed priority schedule. Here, 
each component is to execute according to a priority, where the data processing has 
the highest priority until execution, where prediction has the next highest priority. 
Each component must perform according to a deadline, where we evenly distribute 
the time for each component, where the best case for each is 30 seconds and the worst 
is 1 minute. The performance time of the system is the sum of execution of each com- 
ponent, where if it is proven that each component can perform to the deadline, then 
the system can also perform against the deadline as well. 
Whist the work described in [19] is very important, it is not complete in the sense 
that it ignores the impact of the time required to perform system tasks. And there are 
reasons to believe that such overhead in not negligible, since interrupt handling, task 
switching and preemption are vital to fixed priority scheduling and may occur fre- 
quently. Two implementations are possible for a fixed priority scheduler [19]: event- 
driven and time-driven. In event-driven scheduling, all tasks are initiated by internal 
or external events. 
 
 
6 SPARK Prototype 
 
This section presents the final phase of the formal design method, in which the ab- 
stract architecture and operational constraints are implemented for the purpose of 
defining a formal prototype. The aim of the prototype is to conduct various simula- 
tions to ensure correct operational behaviour, mainly in terms of real-time execution 
and data flow control. As the operational constraints are captured to describe correct 
operational behaviour, it is important that these are proven for correctness using V&V 
and are formally expressed, which is achieved using SPARK. 
SPARK is based on the principle of Correctness by Construction, an efficient and 
mathematically rigorous approach to software development that avoids defects, or 
detects and removes them quickly. Correctness by Construction involves strong static 
verification as the system is being implemented and allows the cumulative develop- 
ment of certification-oriented evidence. 
SPARK is an Ada subset augmented with a notation for specifying contracts (an- 
notations in the form of Ada comments) that are analysed statically. The current ver- 
sion of SPARK is based on Ada 2005 and includes a large portion of Ada’s static 
semantic facilities such as packages/ encapsulation, subprograms, most types, and 
some Object-Oriented Programming features, as well as the Ravenscar tasking pro- 
file. Features such as exceptions, goto statements, and dynamic binding are excluded 
because they would complicate formal verification; other features such as access 
types (pointers), dynamically sized arrays, and recursion are excluded because they 
would interfere with time or space predictability. 
Below is a brief example of the coded implementation used in building the proto- 
type, which focuses specifically in controlling the execution of tasks by stopping and 
 
 
 
 
 
 
starting them in response to events that occur. Each event is scheduled according to a 
specified deadline, where a simple scheduling algorithm is implemented. For sim- 
plicity, the tasks 
 
package Task_Control 
is 
type Suspension_Object is limited private; 
 
procedure Set_True(S 
: in out Suspension_Object); 
--# derives S from ; 
-- Note the apparent mismatch between the parameter mode and 
the derives annotationR4. 
-- This arises because the Ada run-time system needs to 
read SO in order to determine 
-- whether any tasks should now be started whereas, for flow 
analysis purposes, we only 
-- need to record the fact that SO is given a new value that does 
not depend on any import. 
 
procedure Set_False(S 
: in out Suspension_Object); 
--# derives S from ; 
 
procedure Suspend_Until_True(S 
: in out Suspension_Object); 
--# derives S from ; 
 
private 
--# hide Task_Control; 
end Task_Control; 
 
…. 
 
sub- 
type Any_Priority is Integer range 
0 .. 31; 
sub- 
type Priority is Any_Priority range 
0 .. 30; 
sub- 
type Interrupt_Priority is Any_Priority range 3 
1 .. 31; 
 
Program 1: Program extract for task control and priority scheduling 
 
This code extract is applied to the scheduling algorithm to specify tasks, and the order 
of tasks, that are to be scheduled. The result of the code is that very abstract defini- 
 
 
 
 
 
 
tions of tasks, which simply represent data processing, knowledge query, prediction 
and rescheduling, are scheduled, where the task control extract ensures that the next 
task proceeds when the previous task has completely executed. The priority of sched- 
uling changes after the completion of each task, where initially data processing has 
the highest priority and after its completion, the prediction and knowledge query are 
then given priority. The algorithm iterates in a cycle to represent a continuous stream 
of data that is provided to the advisory system and performs over 100000 iterations 
before terminating. 
The final coded solution also includes various procedures that regulate data flow 
control, particularly in terms of ensuring that each component, as a defined process, 
sends and receives data in the correct format, which is defined as an object for sim- 
plicity, and that the data object is initialised with some value. If the value is null an 
exception is thrown and the process is unable to complete, however, to ensure that the 
system doesn’t crash, the final output is simply an exception message. 
 
 
7 Conclusions 
 
This paper proposed a formal design method for designing reliable advisory systems, 
where the basic concepts of this were presented. The results that were accumulated 
demonstrated some potential in applying this approach to the development of a formal 
specification of industrial advisory systems in settings where reliability and 
dependability are important requirements. The development of this method, and 
improvement thereof, is an ongoing work, where there are many avenues in which to 
improve that will be explored in the future. A key concern in this approach, which 
is to be ad- dressed in subsequent work, is that while the method aims to provide a 
thorough de- sign for reliability and evaluation of the design, there is a risk that too 
much time can be spent in developing expressive models. It is important that the 
reliability models capture as much detail as possible, in terms of component 
dependencies and execution deadlines. However, significant levels of abstraction 
are required to develop these models and capture the operational constraints. It is 
felt that the description is an oversimplified view of the system and, therefore, may 
be limited in its practical use. This is especially true when developing the formal 
prototype. Although, it is useful in demonstrating the relationship between each 
component, the order of execution, expected time period of execution and data 
control procedures. 
In terms of real-time performance, it is not possible to identify if a component will 
be able to perform in real-time solely by its abstract specification. This is because 
concrete specifications and algorithm designs are typically analysed to estimate real- 
time capability, which are not available from an architectural perspective. A difficulty 
is that the architectural style of many components, defined by the specification, are 
fault-tolerant – which impacts on real-time performance as recovery processes can be 
costly in execution time. However, some processes are also concurrent and a predict- 
able finite process model is defined, which provides some confidence of real-time 
execution at an architectural level. At this stage, it is believed to be possible to extend 
the constraints of the process model by defining a scheduling model. A more accurate 
 
 
 
 
 
 
estimate, however, and indeed a proof, can be derived from the analysis of the algo- 
rithms that are used and empirical evidence can be gathered post-implementation. 
Nevertheless, time constraints are defined and incorporated into the model, where a 
predictable and deterministic performance is required to ensure that these constraints 
are met. 
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